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Chapter 1: Introduction
As the largest and most powerful alliance in the history of the world, the future NATO is
a topic of incredible importance for the future of international relations. At the end of the Cold
War, the bipolar structure which led to the creation of NATO was suddenly gone. The Soviet
Union had been reduced to a shadow of its former glory, and the threat it represented to the
nations of Western Europe was gone. Without a nemesis to unite it, many predicted NATO
would disintegrate following the trend of every other alliance in history. Nevertheless, the
Alliance has remained, and even in the absence of the unified Soviet threat, has grown to
encompass the majority of Europe and be more active than at any point in its history.
The future of NATO is a topic of great importance to the future of the world for two
reasons: first, as a union of many of the great powers, both current and former, of the world, it
holds a stabilizing role in preventing a return to the system of multipolarity which defined the
history of Europe; and secondly, it is the primary example of a union of democratic powers and a
working example of Kantian and Deutschian theories on democratic peace. The collapse of
NATO, due to a lack of a serious threat, could even return Europe to an anarchic system of
multi-polarity and power politics and dramatically increase the chances of war throughout the
world. The future of world peace and the global balance of power depends upon either the
continued dominance of NATO or the resulting power struggle if it falls apart.
My argument about NATO’s future is a combination of both neo-realist and
constructivist thought, an adaptation of both neo-realist power struggles and constructivist
institutional structures. Due to a lack of a significant threat, NATO will collapse as a military
alliance. However, due to the longevity of the Trans-Atlantic Relationship, the similarities in the
governmental structure of its members and the history of peaceful interactions between the allies
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on both sides of the Atlantic, the current “security community” will remain despite the collapse
of the military aspects of the Alliance. NATO has been held together through organizational
inertia and shifting the unifying threat to a variety of lesser threats. Nevertheless, the weakness
of the new threat will be insufficient in maintaining the Alliance.
In order to support this argument this paper will be divided into four additional chapters
and a conclusion. The next chapter will provide a theoretical overview of alliance formation and
maintenance theory. This summary will expound the theory supporting my argument and provide
a better understanding of the prominent schools of thought upon which my paper is based.
The third chapter will outline the origins of NATO and its development throughout the
Cold War. In order to understand the direction the Alliance will take, it is important to know
where it came from. This section will show how NATO was created through a perception of
threat by the Soviet Union, and how the changing perceptions of that threat throughout the Cold
War affected the unity of the Alliance. I also will provide a theoretical analysis of the major
developments in the history of NATO.
Chapter four will focus on NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union. First, I will
outline the predictions for how the Alliance would develop based upon the theories explained in
Chapter two. Secondly, I will outline what actually happened to the Alliance after the end of the
Cold War. Finally, I will explain why NATO developed as it did.
The fifth chapter will focus on the present day realities of NATO; showing how the
Alliance developed in response to the new threats faced in the 21st Century, specifically the
issues of Russia, the “War on Terror,” and the threat faced by collapsed states; moreover, this
section will elaborate on the strains the Alliance faces due to its extended operations. I also will
show how NATO is setting itself up for the future by examining the developments of NATO’s
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new direction as outlined in the meeting of Ministers in Prague in 2003 and the Strategic
Concept of 2010.
I will conclude the paper by outlining the predicted future of NATO based upon the
trends and theories developed throughout the course of the paper. In this section I will show that
NATO is an alliance which will dissolve, but Europe will not return completely to its multipolar
origins.
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Chapter 2: Alliance Theory
As a discipline within the field of international relations, alliance theory has historically
been underrepresented. This is due to a variety of reasons, not least of all its apparent simplicity.
In his Nations in Alliance, George Liska calls it “impossible to speak of international relations
without referring to alliances,” and places the blame of the lack of resources on the fact that it is
“difficult to say much that is peculiar to alliances on the plane of general analysis.”1 In other
words, there is not a lot to say which has not already been said. It has been common sense since
the days of Thucydides that alliances are bodies of states working together for a common goal,
most likely against a common enemy. To delve further into the formation or maintenance of
alliances is, for many students of international politics, rather unnecessary. This general lack of
enthusiasm resulted in a general drought of scholarship on this issue. The literature which did
emerge, however, can be separated into three distinct theories in the area of alliance formation:
realist/neorealist theory, liberalist theory, and constructivist theory. In the area of alliance
maintenance, there are two prominent theories: neo-realism and institutionalism/organizational
behavior. The sections which follow will serve to outline the basics of each theory and its
corresponding literature. Through this discussion of literature, I will develop the theoretical basis
from which I will analyze the actions and reactions of NATO and form a prediction on its future.
Alliance Formation
Realism/Neorealism
Originating in the international relations theories of Thucydides, Machiavelli and
Hobbes, the “realists,” and their intellectual heirs the “neorealists,” base their arguments in a
1

George Liska, Nations in Alliance, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), 3.
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belief in the anarchic nature of the international stage. Beginning with Hans J. Morgenthau’s
Politics Among Nations, and continuing through Liska, Kenneth Waltz, and Stephen Walt (with
modifications by the latter two), “realist” literature reestablished the historically prominent
balance of power perspective of alliance creation. The essential argument is summarized best by
Liska as he writes: “Alliances are against, and only derivatively for, someone or something.”2 In
other words, the sole purpose for alliances is to respond to a threat posed by an opposing power.
According to Morgenthau, nations have three possible responses to a threat posed by an
opposing power: “They can increase their own power, they can add to their power the power of
other nations, or they can withhold power of other nations from the adversary.”3 The latter two
choices result in alliances; a policy which is not preferred by a nation, for it reduces the nation’s
ability to pursue its own interests, but which will be enacted if absolutely necessary.4
On the formation of alliances, Stephen Walt’s The Origins of Alliances is one of the most
respected and quoted sources. Using historical evidence, Walt argues that the creation of
alliances is based primarily on balancing and bandwagoning actions taken by states in response
to a rising threat one or more states. Bandwagoning behavior is displayed when a state aligns
itself with a nation which is growing in perceived power and is a possible threat to the original
state. In essence, success in policy, war, or simply the creation of a large enough threat will drive
the nations on the “sidelines” to ally with the nation displaying success. 5 In terms of balancing,
Walt adjusts the theory presented by Morgenthau and Liska, arguing that instead of simply
moving to create equilibrium in the face of power, the formation of alliances is in response to a
2

Liska, 12.
Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson (ed), Politics Among Nations, 5th Edition, (New York: McGraw
Hill, 1993), 197.
4
Ibid.
5
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, (Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1987), 19. Bandwagoning is also discussed in
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979), 126.

3
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perceived threat. “Threat” is based upon the “power, proximity, offensive capabilities, and…
intentions” of the opponent.6 As opposed to balance of power theory which suggests that nations
will adjust to the largest power, balance of threat allows for the creation of a coalition which is
much more powerful than the opposing one, since the threat perceived by the allies is much
greater with the opposition gaining power than with the allies growing too strong. This explains
how coalitions can be formed in order to defeat opposing coalitions, such as the allies defeat of
the Axis powers in World War II.7
Ole Holsti, P. Thompson Hopman, and John D. Sullivan’s behavioral analysis of
alliances in Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances attempts to find a correlation
between the construction and behaviors of alliances and the theoretical predictions provided by
the various schools of thought. Though they did not find any real conclusive results supporting
any of the theories of alliance formation, they were able to show a change in behavior based
upon threat. They found that a rise in threat level significantly increased the cohesion of an
alliance, allowing the alliance to respond more readily to the threat.8 Though correlation is not
causation, this does show some support for “realist” theory of balance against a threat.
Liberalism
Founded by the German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, the concept of liberalism is a far
more idealistic theory than its realist counterpart. Unlike the realists’ perpetual state of anarchy
and power politics, classical liberalists believe that there is a potential for peace other than the
balancing of power. Likewise, there is potential for the development and maintenance of
alliances outside of the search for strength and maneuvering for power.
6

Walt, 264.
Ibid.
8
Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances:
Comparative Studies, (New York: Wiley, 1973), 84 and 143.
7
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In his essay “Perpetual Peace,” Kant dares to suggest an actual set of guidelines through
which peace can actually be established. Primary among his arguments is a worldwide adaptation
of a “republican constitution.”
The reason is this: if the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that
war should be declared… nothing is more natural than that they would be very
cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the
calamities of war. Among the latter would be: having to fight, having to pay the
costs of war from their own resources, having painfully to repair the devastation
war leaves behind, and, to fill up the measure of evils, load themselves with a
heavy national debt that would embitter peace itself and that can never be
liquidated on account of constant wars in the future.9
Thus the citizens will be unlikely to come to a consensus in declaring war since, unlike with an
autocratic ruler, they will be forced to bear the brunt of the war by themselves.10
Though a particularly attractive proposition, liberalist theory has drawn significant
amounts of criticism from the realist theorists. The detailed studies of alliances by Stephen Walt
critiques the concept arguing that there is little evidence that alliances are created and maintained
due to similarities in ideology (though as it was a adapted for historical study as collaboration
between states of comparable ideology rather than between republican governments).11 Holsti,
Hopmann, and Sullivan, show that there is some relationship between ideology and the creation
of alliances, but it is not applicable to all areas of alliance cooperation.12
In a more updated overview of Kant’s theories as applied to the modern world, Michael
W. Doyle argues that even though democratic states are not less warlike in comparison to nondemocratic nations, “constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one

9

Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” (1795), Accessed 2/23/11,
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm.
10
See Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War; A Theoretical Analysis, (New York: Columbia University Press,
1959), for a detailed overview of both liberalist and realist theory.
11
Walt p. 266
12
Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, p.65
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another.”13 While it is difficult to argue that the wars are impossible, it seems apparent that
nations with similar democratic constitutions seem to find other outlets, rather than war, to
resolve their conflicts. He goes on to provide a strong critique of realist interpretations of the
current state of peace between the liberal states. Though, realists argue, the benefits of balance of
power and prudent diplomacy might be reasons behind this, at no time in history have the
“traditional” diplomatic policies brought about such a breadth and depth of peace.14
Constructivism
“Constructivist” advocates of theories of alliance creation and maintenance, argue that
they exist somewhere between the idealism of Kantian liberalist theory and the anarchic world
outlined by the realists. Constructivism “claims that how the material world shapes, changes, and
affects human interaction, and is affected by it, depends on prior and changing epistemic and
normative interpretations of the material world.”15 In other words, they believe that our values
and perception of the world is what shapes its political realities. In the pursuit analyzing alliances
and the development of peace, the constructivists advance the theory of “security communities”
first outlined by Karl Deutsch.
Though not a constructivist himself, Karl Deutsch’s theories on “security communities”
have been fully integrated into the constructivist views on alliance theory. He summarizes this
concept stating: “A security-community… is one in which there is real assurance that the
members of the community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in

13

Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12 (1983),
Accessed 2/23/11, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265298. 213, (authors emphasis)
14
Ibid., 218-221.
15
Barnett and Adler, 15
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some other way.”16 These communities can become integrated into two separate bodies. (i.e.)
amalgamated security-communities, that is two independent states brought together into a single
state; or into pluralistic security communities, two legally separate bodies which are unified in a
common goal, yet will never fight each other. An example of the first would be the United
States, while an example of the second would be NATO.17
Unlike the Kantian liberalists who argue a very similar hypothesis, constructivists do not
limit the development of these communities to democracies. Societies can become entwined
[t]hrough transactions such as trade, migration, tourism, cultural and educational
exchanges, and the use of physical communication facilities, a social fabric is
built not only among elites but also the masses, instilling in them a sense of
community.18
Rather than being based upon a political ideology, security communities emerge from continued
interactions, institutional similarities, and historical connections between two or more societies.
It is important to mention that Deutsch means this movement as a permanent transition rather
than a simple alliance, essentially stating that states can become unified in such a way that they
are no longer concerned about balancing the other members of their community or the inherent
security dilemmas of alliances.
Alliance Maintenance and Behavior
Neorealism
The behavior of alliances, and the nations which make up alliances, is discussed with
vivid detail in Kenneth Waltz’ theoretical work Theory of International Politics. Waltz is
dissatisfied with a simple discussion of balance of power, since it does not predict behavior of
16

Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area;
International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 5.
17
Ibid., pp. 6-7
18
Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, Security Communities, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998),
7.
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alliances.19 Though a state will ally with anyone in response to a great enough threat, the
effectiveness of these alliances is based upon how well they are managed and how tightly bound
the states are. The basic argument Waltz advances is: the greater the cohesion of a bloc, and the
stronger the coercive power of the leader of the bloc, the more flexible its policy. This is the case
because the allies can act more broadly when they are more certain that their alliance will not fall
apart due to conflicts of interest. 20 Therefore, in a multi-polar world, alliances are less able to be
flexible on policy since alignment between alliances can change rapidly; in order to keep the
alliance, the powers must compromise their interests. In contrast, a bipolar world allows the
alliance leaders to have greater control over the policies of their respective alliances, since the
contributions of the minor players, though wanted, are not necessary for the leader to retain
power.21
In the area of intra-alliance cooperation, Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan do provide a
depth of analysis which is of particular use in analyzing the maintenance of alliances. They
outline four basic theories for of the ability of an alliance to continue and to function: ideological
homogeneity, regime stability, unity of goals, and systemic characteristics. Again, the data they
provide little conclusive support for either theory, but they do show that each is a contributing
factor.22
In his book, Alliance Politics, Glenn H. Snyder provides an in-depth overview of alliance
theory and, through a detailed historical analysis of alliances in pre-World War I Europe,
advances a series of theories on how alliances are managed. Though he bases his argument on
“neorealist” theory, he updates a series of terms and arguments; redefining them based upon
19

Waltz (1979), 122-123.
Ibid., pp. 166-167.
21
Ibid., pp. 168-169.
22
Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, 59-85.
20
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more modern realities of alliance. In the area of alliance formation, Snyder cautions against strict
reliance upon the theories of balancing arguing that it tends to be, in reality, more of an
“automatic systemic tendency” to shift towards powers with similar interests as opposed to an
actual conscious decision to balance (though ultimately it ends similarly).23 In terms of alliance
management, Snyder’s theories can be summarized as an attempt to balance a state’s interests
with the relations between other nations in the alliance. This creates occasions when a nation acts
seemingly against its best interests in order to maintain its relationship with its allies. Such
actions, such as consulting with allies before making large changes and obliging the desires of
allies over one’s own interests, are attempts to maintain alliances in the absence of significant
threats or sufficient cohesion within the alliance.24
Institutionalism/Organizational Behavior
A relatively new addition to the theoretical explanations of the actions of states and
alliances is the institutionalist camp. Institutionalism derives from liberalist and constructivist
theories for its arguments emerge after the states have come together and formed international
institutions. Institutions are, as defined by one of the founders of the movement Robert O.
Keohane, a “related complex of rules and norms identifiable in space and time” which can be
formed into regimes which are “specific institutions involving states and/or transnational actors,
which apply to particular issues in international relations.”25 The importance of these institutions
in terms of alliances is that “alliances are institutions, and that both their durability and strength
(the degree to which states are committed to alliances, even when costs are entailed) may depend

23

Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics, (Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1997), 156-158.
Ibid., pp. 350, 361, 371.
25
Qtd. in Robert B. McCalla, “NATO’s Persistence after the Cold War,” International Organization 50, no. 3
(Summer, 1996): 461.
24
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on their institutional characteristics.”26 In other words, a nation within an alliance’s actions may
be limited due to the institutional characteristics of an alliance, so the nation may act against its
best interest due to its participation. Institutionalists do not deny the validity of realist theories on
formation of alliances or on the realities of power unbalances, they simply qualify the theories
with an addendum that “institutions matter” in the actions of nations.27
Delving deeper into the practical realities of institutional behavior necessitates the
integration of organizational behavior theory.28 “Complex bureaucracies [such as NATO] are
composed of individuals and interest groups who ‘must be expected to have an interest in their
incomes and careers, and therefore in the survival of the organization in which they are
employed.’”29 It can, therefore, be said that organizations work to perpetuate themselves,
creating an immense resistance to change; especially the kind of change that creates the
deconstruction of the organization. “This organizational ‘survival instinct’ may manifest itself in
bureaucratic inertia, but it can also provide an organization with a ‘life’ of its own, and hence
with a creative potential for inventing new tasks for the organization once old ones are
accomplished.”30 The organization will continue to operate, and even reinvent itself, simply
because the powers that run it do not want it to stop.
Conclusions
Though these theories may come from different schools of thought, I do not find them to
be mutually exclusive. Each theory has its benefits in analyzing a different aspect of a problem.
26

Qtd. in Ibid., 462.
Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security 20, no. 1
(Summer, 1995): 44-47.
28
Though technically different, institutions and organizations tend to function in similar ways, and these two
theories work well together in explaining first the creation of institutions and their actual behavior. I, therefore, will
not distinguish between institutions and organizations in this paper.
29
Martin Reicherd, The EU-NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate,
2006), 111-112
30
Ibid., 112.
27
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Constructivism is particularly useful in analyzing the long ranging effects of alliances on the
nations within the arrangement. Through the creation of a “security community,” nations are far
less likely to engage in any type of martial conflict due primarily to a sense of unity more than
any real regulations. At the same time, states will consistently be looking out for their best
interests, and if those interests do not coincide with the maintenance of an outdated alliance, then
it is entirely possible that the alliance will begin to disintegrate. This is especially true if the
threat faced by the alliance is not of great urgency. A weak threat strengthens the need for
increased involvement of institutional factors in maintaining alliance cohesion. In closing, this
section has provided a basis for the discussion throughout the rest of the paper. The following
chapters will elaborate on the theories presented and apply them to the specific situations
experienced by NATO.
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Chapter 3: Conceived through Threat: NATO in the Cold War
In order to continue advancing the argument that NATO will collapse, it is important to
tie the actions taken in the creation and maintenance of NATO during the Cold War to the
theories on alliance which have been discussed previously. This history reveals the Alliance’s
beginnings; the base upon which the modern NATO is built. The Cold War also makes up
approximately two-thirds of NATO’s active history. It is logical to assume, then, that
conclusions made from this period will have a significant amount of weight on the subsequent
actions of the Alliance. Keeping this assumption in mind, this chapter will outline the facts
behind the creation of NATO. Following each section will be an analysis of the actions taken by
NATO through the framework of the theories provided in the second chapter.
The Origins of NATO
In 1945, Europe had been systematically destroyed by six years of brutal war—
physically, economically, and spiritually—which would take decades to heal. Amidst the ruins of
Europe stood the Allied forces; victorious against the forces of Nazism, yet wary of a new
potential conflict between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Representative of two diametrically
opposed ideologies, these two countries began an almost immediate struggle for the future of
Europe.
The Building of a Threat
Pedersen 14

Even before American involvement in World War II, distrust of the Soviet Union was
building. In a statement to The New York Times on June 22, 1941 (immediately after the
invasion of Russia by Germany) then Senator Truman stated: “If we see that Germany is winning
we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let
them kill as many as possible…”31 There was little difference, in the minds of many Americans
and other Allied countries, between the fascist totalitarianism of Nazism and the communist
ideologies of the Soviet Union. While gradually it became apparent that the United States would
have to work with the Stalin and his forces, the Alliance would never be easy. Even the
traditionally congenial and ever-diplomatic President Roosevelt, after reading a particularly
blustering and demanding letter received from Stalin, would go on to say: “We can’t do business
with Stalin.”32
As the war progressed, and victory became more certain, fear of growing Soviet
expansionism began to increase dramatically. It was clear that Russia would come out of the war
as the most powerful nation in Europe, and the comportment of Russia in Eastern Europe hinted
at an alternative agenda to the destruction of Nazi Germany. Reporting on relations with Russia,
Ambassador W. Averell Harriman wrote: “We must clearly recognize that the Soviet program is
the establishment of totalitarianism [in Eastern Europe], ending personal liberty and democracy
as we know and respect it.”33 Furthermore, it must be understood that the Soviets would not
follow the general rules of international policies, so caution must be taken in working together.34
After the victory in Europe, the three leaders—Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, and
Harry Truman—met to discuss the future of Europe at a conference in Potsdam from July 17 to
31

Qtd in David McCullough, Truman, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 262.
Qtd in Ibid., 371.
33
Qtd. In Ibid., 372.
34
Ibid.

32
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August 2. In the weeks prior to the conference, Churchill, requested multiple times that he and
President Truman meet to discuss their approach to the Russian problem. Though aware of the
threat, Truman refused, fearing that Stalin would see this act as an alliance against him.
Nevertheless, Potsdam was a conference which did little to change the set views of any of the
Allies. Stalin refused to relinquish any of his sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, while
Truman and Churchill preached of the need for an international order to defend international law.
Ultimately the Potsdam Conference resulted in the beginning of a reality which would dominate
the world for the next 45 years: two separate spheres of influence, by two ideologically opposed
powers.35
Analysis
The weakness of the Allies was apparent to all, and though the Soviet Union was
significantly damaged, it chose to act from a position of power and repeatedly demanded the
ability to have a virtual free rein in Eastern Europe. As the expansionist goals of the Soviet
Union became more obvious, the distrust and fear among the allies grew. Through this slow
increase in perception of threat, the unity of opinion grew against the Soviet Union. Among the
Americans, there was a great sense of unease with the goals of the Soviet Union, but not enough
to follow Churchill into building a consensus against Stalin.
Two main theories can be used to explain the actions of the countries at the end of World
War II. From a neorealist perspective it can be seen that the threat from the Soviet Union, though
substantial, was not sufficient to create a solid alliance against the former “friend.” Truman was
unwilling to isolate the Soviets completely, for the threat faced was not substantial enough to
create a direct change in policy.
35

Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 434-436.
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Certain credence can be given to the liberalist theory as well. Though there was no formal
change in alliance, the values from the two democracies—the United States and Great Britain—
begin to shine through in their cooperation during the Potsdam conference. The two leaders are
working together based upon their shared values, despite the initial reluctance of the Truman
administration to unite formally against the Soviets. This action shows an informal alliance
forming between the democratic nations against the authoritarian Russians.
Reconstruction, a Growing Threat, and the Formation of NATO
After an explosive display of power by the United States in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the
most violent and destructive war in the history of the world officially ended on September 2,
1945 with the formal surrender of Japan to the United States. While this period of direct
hostilities was over, it began a new era of diplomatic battle lasting until 1991.
As stated above, the growing distrust between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers
(led primarily by the United States) had divided Europe into two separate spheres of influence:
the Soviet Union in the East and the other Allied nations in the West, with Berlin acting as the
meeting point between the two. With the rest of the democratic powers mostly destroyed by the
war, the traditionally isolationist United States saw itself as the sole defender of democratic
freedom against the specter of communist ideology. This leadership position became especially
trying as the effects of the war were felt and Soviet influence began to expand into more
territories as the colonial powers (particularly Great Britain) began to retreat from their areas of
influence.
This issue came to a head in the beginning of 1947. Greece and Turkey were going to
lose their funding from the United Kingdom and were on the verge of economic collapse.
Making matters worse was the interest that the Soviet Union was placing in the area. The signs
Pedersen 17

were pointing to an imminent Communist party takeover of the nations. With an incursion into
Greece and Turkey, the Soviet Union had a staging block with which they could spread into
Africa, Iran, and even Western Europe. The United States alone was in a position to act against
this expansion.36
The American response was quick and direct: $400,000 would be sent to aid Greece and
$350,000 to Turkey. In his speech to the Congress in proposing this act, President Truman
outlined the new mission of the United States in protecting the world order:
To support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressure… [and] to assist free people to work out their
own destinies… primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential
to economic stability and orderly political process.37
The United States would move to support democracy, with the goal of containing the threat of
Soviet influence throughout the world. Known as the Truman Doctrine, this piece of legislation,
and its policy of containment, became one of the cornerstones of American policy throughout the
Cold War.
The next important policy which served as a foundation to NATO was the Marshall Plan,
an ordinance which had the desired, dual outcome of strengthening the ties between the United
States and Europe and in furthering the division between Western Europe and the Soviet Union.
First outlined in a speech by Secretary of State George Marshall at Harvard University, the
Marshall plan had the goal of reviving “a working economy in the world so as to permit the
emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.”38 It was not
ostensibly directed against any nation, in fact the Soviet Union was invited to participate though

36

Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation; My Years in the State Department, (New York: W. W. Norton and
Company, 1987), 217-219.
37
Qtd in Ibid., 222.
38
Qtd in Ibid., 233.
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it declined, but it was done with the understanding that the aid would be going primarily to
Western Europe. This prediction was validated once the Soviet Union stated their intention to
abstain from participation. With the cooperation of Britain, France, and other minor European
nations, a plan was devised for the recovery of Europe. Over the next three years the United
States would be loaning raw materials and basic production necessities to Europe in exchange for
a return payment after recovery.39
Stalin responded to these measures by solidifying his area of influence. Any leaders
thought to have even the slightest nationalist tendencies were purged, and in February 1948, a
communist coup occurred in Czechoslovakia sending shockwaves throughout the continent. The
fear of other communist inspired coups and continued Soviet expansion culminated in the
Brussels Treaty signed in April, 1948, between the Benelux nations, the United Kingdom, and
France, creating the Western Union Defense Organization, the first example of a joint defense
pact in Western Europe. It was immediately apparent, however, that Europe did not have the
material power to stand against the Soviet Union alone; the United States would have to get
involved.40
Though the need for American military aid to Western Europe was becoming
increasingly apparent, it took another significant break with the Soviet Union to create the North
Atlantic Treaty: the blockade of Berlin in June, 1948. The response by the Western nations was
calm, yet firm; an airlift, which would alleviate the suffering of the Berlin people, and not
directly antagonize the Soviets. After much conversation and negotiation, Stalin finally gave up
his attempt to achieve full control of Berlin and lifted the blockade on May 23, 1949, a little

39
40

Ibid., 230-235.
Kissinger, 457

Pedersen 19

more than a month after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. Reflecting on the lesson
learned through this process in his memoirs, Secretary of State Dean Acheson writes:
Soviet authorities are not moved to agreement by negotiation… They cling
stubbornly to a position hoping to force an opponent to accept it. When and if
action by the opponent demonstrates the Soviet position to be untenable, they
hastily abandon it…41
In other words, it is necessary to meet the Soviet Union’s demands with resolute force, or they
will continue without concession.
The increased aggression by the Soviet Union in the blockade of Berlin in 1948 and their
continued attempts to expand their influences into the West, led to the creation of the North
Atlantic Treaty signed on April 4, 1949. The original signatories included 12 nations--the United
States, Canada, the signatories of the Brussels Treaty, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and
Portugal. The treaty outlined a variety of goals: settling international disputes, strengthening free
institutions, and the encouraging economic cooperation.42 The most important aspect of the
treaty, however, was its commitment to military defense including the oft-mentioned Article 5,
stating “that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be
considered an attack against them all,” thus authorizing repercussive force by any member.43 In
supporting Article 5, and alleviating the fears of being drawn into a foreign war without consent,
the signatories added in Article 11 stating that the “Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions
carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.”44
Through this Article the member nations would retain their own capability to go to war, ensuring
that it was carried out legally. Following the signing of the document was the creation of the
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joint military organization known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO;
organized with the mission of supporting the treaty in all aspects.

Analysis
The threat of the Soviet Union was growing, and the inability of Europe to protect itself
was more apparent than ever. As Russia moved in to take over Eastern Europe, there was little
the allies could do. The development of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were clear
actions of balancing by the United States against the threat of the Soviet Union. The former
worked to solidify the support of the Greek and Turkish nations through both economic and
political means, by making it clear that the United States would fight to maintain the freedom of
election within a nation. The Marshall Plan took the same theory and applied it on a broader
scale to Western Europe as a whole, giving the Western Powers a greater ability to rebuild and
creating a stronger alliance base against the Soviet Union.
The Brussels Treaty of 1948 is another example of balancing against a common threat.
With the fall of Czechoslovakia, the rest of Europe started fearing uprisings in their own nations
as well. It was obvious to the Western European nations that they could not stand against the
threat of the Soviet Union independently, but unified they were much more powerful. Through
this defense pact, they could ensure that the Soviet Union would be less likely to invade due to
the increased possible cost of retaliation.
In a similar fashion, the North Atlantic Treaty came together. The growing
aggressiveness of the Soviet Union and the weakness of Western Europe made it essential for the
United States to get involved. The major impetus for United States involvement—the reasoning
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given to the population—was to halt the expansion of Soviet ideology, and strengthen Europe.
This argument is also supported by the North Atlantic Treaty itself. The centrally important
Article 5 is directly in line with the balancing of threat theory, for it requires military action to
protect any nation within the Alliance. In another view, it is an assurance of protection against a
perceived threat.
Even the selection of members for the Alliance is an example of neorealist balance of
power politics. Liberalist theory would predict the union to consist of allies with similar
ideologies, and this is ostensibly the goal of the Alliance as laid out in the founding document;
however, the inclusion of Portugal, then residing under the Salazar authoritarian government,
shows a desire to unite against the threat of communism regardless of ideology.
Alliance Maintenance: NATO from 1949-1989
Solidifying the Alliance
The threat faced, though initially expressed above, was solidified in a document created
by the National Security Council in 1950, known as NSC-68. The Kremlin sought to expand its
control directly over all countries which it could influence, and would continue unless opposed.
That would be the role of the United States and its allies.45 Furthermore, the only way for the
confrontation of ideology to end was the total conversion of the Soviet Union away from its
communist ideology. Uniquely, the document rejected the use of destructive force, arguing that
the national values it sought to advance “would be achieved through global reform, not global
conquest.”46 Ironically, this ideology would lead to military action in order to achieve these
heady, democratic goals.
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Despite the signing of the NAT and the American commitment to end communism, it
became apparent that the forces for the defense of Europe were drastically insufficient for their
task. At the end of June, 1950 the United States became involved in Korea, in response to the
aggression of communist North Korea, sponsored by the Chinese and Soviet Union. It was
argued that a failure to act would lead to increased brazenness by the Soviets, and possible
expansion into Europe.47 The result of this was an increase in the belief of NATO cohesion and
the putting of the “O” in NATO in June 1950.48
The war in Korea had a direct impact on the organization as a whole, helping to unify the
Alliance in a way which nothing else could have. Here was a direct threat by Communist power
on a free nation, necessitating intervention from a member of NATO. This conflict had a few
extremely important consequences on the future of NATO. First, it assured that the United States
would continue to be involved in Europe, for if the Soviet Union would make a move in Korea it
was possible that it would force the issue in Central and Eastern Europe as well.49 In response to
“the sixty thousand East German military police and twenty seven Russian divisions also in East
Germany… [were] NATO’s twelve ill-equipped and uncoordinated divisions with little air
support.”50 However, due to the lack of funds and men in Europe, it was apparent that it would
be extremely difficult to create the necessary army without German involvement, in addition to
increased American military presence. Though this was only enacted in principle—it wasn’t until
5 years later that the Germans would integrate forces—it was a major step forward in the
integration of the Alliance.
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The second major change for the alliance was that the organization went through a series
of changes in its organizational structure. The conflict in Korea resulted in the creation of
SHAPE, the strategic command center in Europe, new political strengths being given to the
NATO council, and increased political structuring (such as permanent advisors to the Secretary
General). Finally, the Korean conflict gave a new geographic shape to the alliance allowing for
the induction of Turkey and Greece in response to the growing communist pressures in the area.
It was assured that NATO would remain relevant and would be in place against the threat of
communism in Europe.51
This increase in armaments to Europe was driven by nuclear policy as well as
conventional arms. In 1949, the Soviet Union tested their first atomic weapon, and by 1953 they
had developed the hydrogen bomb. The presence of an American nuclear arsenal in Europe,
provided a very powerful deterrent to the Soviet usage of weapons against Europe; similarly the
nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union prevented NATO from using the weapons on the Soviet
Union. The policy which developed out of this stalemate known as Mutually Assured
Destruction (MAD), was the status quo for the majority of the Cold War and a primary reason
for the limited conflict in Europe.52
With the exception of the hostilities in Korea, the 1950’s were relatively peaceful for the
Alliance. In 1952, Stalin issued a “Peace Note” calling for the separation of spheres of influence
and a cooling of hostilities, and though this had relatively little effect on NATO actions—the
build-up of troops continued and the Americans, for all intents and purposes, ignored it—it
issued in a relative period of détente, due to a lack in Soviet aggression. Stalin passed away less
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than a year after this Note, and his political followers stepped carefully in order to avoid Western
exploitation of this death. This period of détente culminated in the Geneva Summit of 1955,
which achieved virtually nothing more than a feeling of calm and a false belief that the Soviet
Union would be willing to make concessions.53
During this period of relative peace, three nations joined NATO: Greece (1952), Turkey
(1952), and Western Germany (1955). Also, in opposition to NATO, the Warsaw Pact was
created in 1955, composed of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary,
Poland, and Romania.
Analysis
The solidifying of the Alliance directly corresponds with the neo-realist view point. As
the threat of Soviet expansion continued to grow stronger, the Alliance needed to continue to
strengthen both its military might and internal cohesiveness. The acceptance, even in principle,
of West German rearmament shows the power of the perceived Soviet threat. Since the memory
of German atrocities remained fresh in the minds of all of the Europeans, the perceived threat by
the Soviet Union needed to be tremendous in order for the allies to consider this action,
especially France. This acceptance was a direct expansion of NATO power, making it apparent
that the growth of perceived threat was a direct impetus for the strengthening of the Alliance.
This period is an example of increased cohesion of the alliance as well. There were increased
political and military structures being brought in to place by a strong threat on the Eastern Front.
It was increasingly apparent that the alliance was necessary to the maintenance of peace in
Europe.
Issues between Allies
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Following, and during, the relative peace of the early 1950’s, 3 major crises broke out:
between members of the Alliance: with the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956, the Berlin Crisis between
NATO and the Soviet Union in 1958, and the withdrawal of France from the military functions
of NATO in 1966.
The Suez Canal crisis was instigated by the sale of Soviet armaments to Egypt beginning
in 1955. The new Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, was gambling that the Soviet Union could gain a
foothold in the Middle East without any major conflict with NATO. Unfortunately, that was not
the case. Great Britain, already concerned by the growing nationalism in Egypt led by Colonel
Gamal Abdel Nasser, grew increasingly annoyed by the nation’s increased power, and France
was incensed by the military and moral support Egypt provided to Algeria and Morocco. These
nations demanded intervention and were prepared to act. America, on the other hand was
unconvinced. President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Dulles, believed that they
could court the nationalist Egyptians into an opposition of communism; therefore, they opposed
any military intervention into Egypt.54 This began the deepest conflict between the three
powerful allies of NATO. The United States went so far as to threaten its withdrawal from
NATO if France and Britain pressed the issue. In October, 1956 British and French troops were
ordered into the Canal, followed by an absolute resolution by the United States demanding the
cessation of conflict. At this point the Soviet Union entered, offering to join with the United
States in joint military action to stop the conflict, only to be rebuked by Eisenhower. At
approximately the same time, the Soviet Union had entered into Hungary, exploiting the division
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of NATO, and quashing an opposition movement. The next day, England and France ended
hostilities in the Suez Canal.55
Due in part to the perceived split in NATO leadership, Khrushchev decided to issue an
ultimatum in November of 1958, calling for the removal of all Western forces from Berlin, at
which time the Soviets would withdraw from East Berlin. The ultimate goal of this would be the
reunification and neutrality of Germany. While all parties agreed that there needed to be a
change on the position of Berlin, none could agree on the specifics. In 1961, after the election of
Kennedy, the Soviets began construction of the Berlin Wall. Now backed into a corner, the
United States sent troops to the city resulting in a dead-lock. In 1963, after five years of
grandstanding without any real action in Europe, and being forced to back-down from his
placement of missiles in Cuba,56 Khrushchev announced that an additional treaty dealing with
Berlin was unnecessary—essentially accepting defeat.57 NATO had held its ground and forced
the Soviet Union to concede. This was the final major military confrontation in Europe during
the Cold War.
The next great disagreement within the Alliance was the departure of the French in 1966.
President Charles de Gaulle had entered into power again in 1958, and angered by continued
refusal of the allies to intervene in Africa and Indochina, the perceived monopoly by the AngloAmerican relationship over the direction of NATO, and the lack of prominence of France, he
announced that they would remove themselves from the military aspects of the Alliance.58 This
move was also motivated by the belief that France’s development of the nuclear bomb and its
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own military strength would serve as a sufficient deterrent to attack. It did, however, remain a
part of the political side of the Alliance. This move affected the Alliance both militarily and
politically. The disruption of the military infrastructure which the Alliance depended on for
movement of troops damaged the allies in their ability to respond to a domestic war. Politically,
this move shifted the balance of power within the Alliance more towards the American side,
creating an increased dominance of American policy over Europe.59
Analysis
These first major divisions between the allies continue to follow the neo-realist’s
predicted pattern of alliances. As the perceived threat fell, with Stalin’s Peace Note in 1952 and
the Geneva Conference in 1955, the necessity of the Alliance began to diminish slightly.
Therefore, the allies felt able to pursue a course that might alienate the United States and
jeopardize the Alliance. France and Great Britain saw less of animmediate threat from the Soviet
Union than against their interests in Northern Africa. Even when the United States threatened
reprisal, France and Great Britain continued their path. Once the Berlin Crisis struck in 1958—a
Soviet response to perceived weakness within the Alliance—the allies began to reconsider their
actions. Both nations realized the escalation of the conflict was damaging to the Alliance and
decided to forgo their immediate interests in favor of additional response to the greater threat.
Similarly, once the problems with the Berlin Crisis were finished in 1963, the immediate
threat of the Soviet Union again appeared to be diminishing. This allowed France to become
more concerned with its disagreements with the other allies, leading to their departure from the
military side of the Alliance. At the same time the rest of the members of the Alliance decided to
remain within the military structure, owing in a large part to the very real sense of threat felt by
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the rest of the allies. Ultimately, a reduction of threat appears to increase division within the
Alliance, while an increase in threat increases cohesion.
In addition to the neo-realist theory, the constructivist “security community” theory also
is important in this series of events. Though France was disgruntled enough to remove itself from
the military alliance, it did not alienate itself politically. Trade, political collaboration, and
communication continued between the allies. Furthermore, the fall out between the allies was not
sufficient to create hostilities, or to drive France in to the Soviet camp. The years of cooperation
had strengthened the ties of the allies, so even if issues divided them, there was little potential for
conflict.
The End of the Cold War
After the major problems of the late 1950’s and 1960’s, the remainder of the Cold War
was fought primarily through proxies. The “wars” which took place were fought through
secondary parties (Nicaragua), or between one power and secondary forces supported by the
other (Vietnam and Afghanistan). Though Vietnam proved to be an increasingly large problem
for the Americans, it had little impact on the Alliance as a whole. The 1970’s were characterized
by Richard Nixon’s détente and triangular diplomacy between the United States, China, and the
Soviet Union. This development, though particularly interesting in its relation to realist theory,
had no real effect on the operations of NATO as a whole.
In the 1980’s, the United States took on a position of increased spending, forcing the
Soviet Union to bankrupt itself while competing for dominance in the arms race. Finally,
beginning with Gorbachev’s famous glasnost and perestroika, the Soviet Union lost its position
of power. It was unwilling or unable to stop neither the revolution in Czechoslovakia, nor the fall
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of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and it was unable to hold itself together when calls for reform
dissolved the Union in 1991.
The issues within NATO had essentially been resolved: France decided to leave the
military side of NATO, while Great Britain took on a more supportive role in relation to
American dominance. The main issues came from the developments in the nuclear field. The
ever increasing reliance on nuclear power made it less and less likely that any real conflict would
take place on European soil. The destructive power of these weapons and the constant threat of
Mutually Assured Destruction led to the development of the START treaties decreasing the
production of nuclear weapons.
In essence, the threat of the Soviet Union remained through the end of the Cold War, but
it was no longer directly threatening Europe. While the Berlin Wall remained a constant
reminder of Soviet presence, there was not another Berlin Crisis which put the entire world at
risk. While revolution was impossible in Eastern Europe, Western Europe was allowed to
develop under the watchful eye of NATO forces. Finally, and most importantly for this
discussion, anti-NATO forces increased, demanding the reduction of arms along the borders and
the removal of nuclear weapons.
General Trends in Theory
Through the discussion of the Cold War history of NATO, there are a few trends which
continue to appear: increased cohesion due to threat, ideological grouping, and the development
of increased political connection due to increased cooperation.
Time after time an increased perception by the allies of the threat from the Soviet Union
led to increased cohesion and cooperation. As the Soviet Union grew in its direct power in
Europe, the Western European nations increased in their strength through growing collaboration
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between themselves and the United States. When the threat was great enough it even led nations
to abandon their own self-interest in pursuit of supporting the Alliance.
The opposite is also apparent. As threat decreased, so too did the cohesion of the
Alliance. The Suez Crisis and the departure of France from the military structure of NATO both
occurred during periods of reduced threat on the European front.
Even when there was no real threat to the Alliance, the nations tended to group along
ideological lines. Before the need for NATO, Churchill and Truman took similar positions in
their meetings with Stalin, often displaying similar values as well. Even during the Suez Crisis
when France and Great Britain were going directly against the will of the United States,
Eisenhower remained supportive of them when faced with joint action with the Soviet Union.
The continued cooperation between the members of NATO even without significant
threat is an interesting development. Though it can be seen that threat affects the interactions
between the allies, at no point did there seem to be a legitimate concern of the Alliance falling
apart. This seems to conform to the predictions established by Deutsch’s security community
theory. Though there may be differences of opinion, overall collaboration—even if it is not
military in nature—did continue.
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Chapter 4: A New Threat, A New Calling: NATO 1989-1999
The collapse of the Soviet Union threat beginning in 1989 created an existential crisis for
NATO. The Alliance, built around the perceived threat of a foreign power, saw its unifying force
fading away. What would be the fate of the Alliance in this new world? This section begins by
outlining the theoretical predictions of the future of NATO after the disintegration of its enemy,
next it delves into the actual developments of NATO during this time of reimagining, and finally
the chapter will discuss the differences between theory and reality in order to show a deeper
understanding of why the Alliance acted as it did.
What Should Have Happened?: Theoretical Predictions for NATO after the Soviet Union
Neo-realism
From a neo-realist perspective, the fall of the Soviet Union did not suggest a brighter
future for the world. “[T]he keys to war and peace lie more in the structure of the international
system than in the nature of the individual states.”60 Therefore, the collapse of the relatively
stable bi-polar system which had dominated the politics of the Europe and the world as a whole
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could only have one conceivable outcome: a return to multipolarity and the virtual state of
anarchy which characterizes the realist image of the world. According to neo-realist theory,
multipolarity is inherently more warlike than a bipolar world primarily for three reasons: first,
because there are far more states in play causing greater likelihood for war than in a world where
all nations are divided between two ideological spectrums; secondly, the relative power between
the states is more skewed, as opposed to the essential equality of military capabilities between
the two sides of a bipolar world; and finally, with more players in the field, it is more difficult to
calculate the relative power of an opponent and their possible alliances.61 The logical outcome of
this type of system, when analyzing it through the eyes of traditional realist theory, is an increase
in conventional warfare between nations.
The difference between the reality of the Europe of the past, upon which most of the
theories of alliances and conflict in different international systems are based, is the presence of
nuclear weapons. With weapons of mass destruction, it is possible to essentially sidestep the
threat of conflict through miscalculation of military power, for it is impossible to attain the upper
hand in relative power without the creation of a strategic defense; a move which is easily
observed due to the immense cost and grand scale of the project. This would allow balancing to
occur against the now stronger opponent, and prevent war on a grander scale.62 As proven by the
conflicts during the Cold War, however, “nuclear weapons eliminate neither the use of force nor
the importance of balancing behavior,” since limited warfare can occur and balance of power is
still essential in maintaining a stable international system.63 While nuclear weapons provide
much of the simplicity and balance of a bipolar system, the presence of many actors creates far
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more chances for limited conflict; furthermore, the increase in nuclear armaments leads to an
increased level of chaos due to the growing number of nuclear stockpiles and potential for their
acquisition by rogue parties.
In terms of NATO, the future appeared similarly bleak. The Organization’s counterpart,
the Warsaw Pact, dissolved fairly rapidly after the Soviet Union lost interest in maintaining it,
and theory indicated that NATO was soon to follow. Now that the Soviet Union had collapsed,
Europe was moving towards a majority of democracies, and the purpose of NATO, to unite “for
collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security,” had essentially been
completed, it was only a matter of time before NATO dissolved as well.64 Also, now that most of
the European nations had the ability to produce nuclear weapons, it seemed unnecessary to
maintain an alliance which essentially was acting as a nuclear deterrent.
“Alliances are organized against a perceived threat;” therefore, historically, “war-winning
coalitions collapse on the morrow of victory, the more surely if it is a decisive one.”65 The threat
was gone, the nemesis defeated, and the Alliance was now more costly to maintain than it was
worth. Kenneth Waltz summed up the neo-realist prediction for the future of NATO saying:
Europe and Russia may for a time look on NATO, and on America’s presence in
Western Europe, as a stabilizing force in a time of rapid change… The Soviet
Union created NATO, and the demise of the Soviet threat “freed” Europe, West
as well as East. But freedom entails self-reliance… In the not-very-long run,
[Europe] will have to learn to take care of themselves or suffer the consequences.
American withdrawal from Europe will be slower than the Soviet Union’s.
America… can still be useful to other NATO countries, and NATO is made up of
willing members. NATO’s days are not numbered, but its years are (emphasis
added).66
Liberalism/Constructivism
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Though different in their predictions on why alliances form, liberalism and
constructivism are fairly equivalent in understanding why they remain together. Liberalist theory
predicted a slightly better course for the future than its neo-realist counterpart. With a the
collapse of the Soviet Union, and the essential invalidation of communism as a political
ideology, the path was open to governmental reform in the former Warsaw Pact nations and in
the other nations formerly under Soviet influence. This new development could conceivably lead
to a much larger population of democracies and thus a broader area of peace. Liberalism would
suggest the fostering of democracy in these newly open nations and an increased economic
cooperation.
The future of NATO, according to liberalist and constructivist theory, would be slightly
more certain. An alliance based upon common values, as liberalism predicts, is more likely to
continue to function stably even though there is no common threat.67 Furthermore, though the
allies had become closer and were more likely to trust each other due to their shared values and
long term interactions, the presence of large amounts of military personnel is an unnecessary
disturbance.
There would, however, be no real reason for NATO to collapse either. Due to the amount
of time spent trading, working, and confiding together, the allies had become a “security
community” in every sense of Deutsch’s definition; therefore, continued cooperation was
extremely likely. Concurrently, NATO could serve as both a consultation body for the allies and
a safety net against any back-slide in the advances of democracy in the former-Soviet Union.68
NATO also could serve as a tool for the fostering and advancing of democracy around the world,
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by using Article 10 of “The North Atlantic Treaty” to expand its membership to recently
democratized nations. Essentially, liberalist and constructivist theory would predict continued
cooperation by the allies, despite the lack of threat, a decrease in foreign armaments present in
Europe, and an increased drive for expansion to help create a broader democratic peace.
Institutionalism/Organizational Behavior
Much like the liberalist and constructivist theories from which it comes, institutionalism
did not predict as bleak of a future as neo-realism. The structures from the international systems
established during the Cold War would essentially remain in place with a few changes to the
future goals of institutions such as NATO. Once they have been established, institutions work to
keep themselves going. The institutional structures help to foster continued cooperation between
the allies.69 As explained by Robert McCalla:
Institutionalist theory would lead us to expect that rather than folding NATO’s
tent, declaring victory, and moving on to create new institutions, NATO members
will take the alliance in new directions, making use of existing procedures and
mechanisms to build on past successes to deal with new problems.70
In other words, there is no reason to reinvent the wheel. Since the members of the institution
understand the procedures and structures of their current system, they would simply adapt it to
the next problem.
This theory led, when combined with organizational behavior, to the prediction that
NATO would continue as it did before simply with new goals and adapted missions. Since
NATO had been an institution for 40 years, it was highly unlikely that it would dissolve rapidly.
The organization will find ways to keep itself relevant in order to keep itself running, and in
doing so, it would protect the careers of the bureaucrats within the organization.
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What Really Happened: The Redefinition of a Threat and the Expansion of NATO
With the sudden collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the subsequent fall of the Soviet
Union in 1991, NATO suddenly found itself as the strongest, intact, military and political power
in the world. Even more impressive, the Cold War had ended without any direct conflict between
the two sides. Nuclear war had been averted, the Warsaw Pact was collapsing, and the threat of
the Soviet Union had been all but eliminated. The Alliance now stood at the most important
crossroads since its creation with a new key question: what to do without its central unifying
threat? This section will outline the developments within NATO from 1989-2001 as the
organization sought to recreate itself for the new realities of a new Europe.
1988-1991: The Creation of a New Strategic Concept
As early as 1988, members of the Alliance were anticipating serious changes in the
security structure of Europe. At a Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government in
Brussels in 1988, the leaders of the nations provided an optimistic, yet still cautious statement on
the new direction of NATO. While they recognized the importance of Gorbachev’s
modernization of the Soviet economy, the Alliance announced its intention to remain “steadfast
in the pursuit of [NATO’s] security policies, maintaining the effective defences and credible
deterrence that form the necessary basis for constructive dialogue.”71 The allies were also
possibly anticipating a weakening of resolve within the Alliance for they once again reaffirmed
their commitment to the values of the organization and the importance of NATO as a security

71

“Declaration of the NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic
Council,” (Brussels, 1988), Accessed 3/21/11, www.nato.int.

Pedersen 37

force in Europe.72 Changes were imminent, and the Alliance was ensuring that it would remain
relevant in a new Europe.
This desire to remain relevant gathered force as the changes in Europe reached a
crescendo. Beginning on November 9, 1989 the Berlin Wall—the great symbol of the Cold
War—was torn down, after East Germans were allowed to cross. All throughout Central and
Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union’s influence was disintegrating, with revolutions taking place in
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania. In order to discuss these changes and
make a statement, NATO members met in July, 1990. “The London Declaration,” as the
resulting statement was called, announced the Alliance’s pleasure with the changes in Europe,
their interest in engaging in conversation with the former Soviet Union, and its decision to
implement a new strategic concept in 1991.73
Most of the nations within NATO agreed, the Alliance should remain, whether it was as a
consultative body, a safeguard against new risks, or a check against a back-slide in the
liberalization of the Soviet Union.74 (Or as former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher put
it: “You don’t cancel your home insurance policy just because there have been fewer burglaries
on your street in the last 12 months.)”75 Therefore, in 1991, the Alliance established a new
strategic concept, outlining the new security situation in the world--primarily the fall of the
Soviet Union and its remaining danger to the international community—and the need for
continued dialogue, cooperation, defense, and the preservation of peace. It also reestablished the
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principles of Article 5, NATO’s identity as a defensive body, and emphasized the necessity of
arms control.76
The new Strategic Concept also organized NATO for the new set of “diverse and multidirectional risks” which were now faced by Europe.77 It called for the creation of a different
structure of military forces, moving towards “a limited but ‘militarily significant’ proportion of
ground, air, and sea immediate and rapid reaction elements.78 NATO also put itself at the
disposal of the UN for peacekeeping missions, giving it a new purpose as a peacekeeping force.79
The immediate development from this concept was the dramatic reduction of forces in
Europe. European nations cut their military personnel by almost 15% on average, and the United
States reduced its troop commitment in the area by approximately two-thirds to 110,000.80 The
large cuts in the military created the need for a restructuring of the command structures of
NATO. The Alliance restructured itself into three separate force types: rapid response, in which
the Immediate Reaction Force (Land) (IRF(L)) acted first, the Allied Command Europe Rapid
Reaction Forces (ARRC) reinforced the (IRF(L)); the main defense forces, which were
multinational in their command structure; and the augmentation forces, which would only be
used to reinforce the other levels.81 The importance of this restructuring is two-fold: first, it
served as the origins of a military force which could deal with threats rapidly and effectively; and
secondly, it was the beginning of multinational corps—“such as the Danish-German Corps, the
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German-Netherlands Corps, and two German-US corps”— which further integrated the
Alliance.82
Redefining Threat: Actions in the Balkans
The wars in the Balkans—first in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993, then in Kosovo in 1999—
resulting from ethnic strife and the fall of the communist powers, emerged as the first major
challenge to the Alliance, after the fall of the Soviet Union. These wars provided the Alliance
with a new mission and a way to solidify the new defense structure which it outlined in the
Strategic Concept of 1991.
As the communist influence in former Yugoslavia began to deteriorate, the ethnic
tensions which had been preeminent in the Balkan area before the Cold War began to flare up
once again. Beginning with Croatia’s declaration of independence in 1991, these tensions
escalated into actual violence. By 1992, 10,000 people had been killed in the fighting and the
conflict had spread to Bosnia, with the Bosnian Croats and Muslims taking up arms against the
Bosnian Serbs.83
NATO was initially hesitant to engage in the conflicts, for while it should have been
preparing for engagement based upon the threat to European security, the internal changes
enacted by the new Strategic Concept had not been fully integrated. The Alliance instead chose
to call for ceasefires and conferences without any significant involvement. In 1993, the allies
agreed to support a UN sponsored ceasefire. Due mostly to the inability of the UN forces to deal
with the actual causes of the conflict and the increasing victories of the Bosnian Serbs, NATO
slowly became more involved.84 Therefore, in the summer of 1995 NATO answered UN calls
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for a sustained airstrike against the Bosnian Serbs, helping to create a ceasefire and aiding in
bringing both sides to the bargaining table in December 1995.85 Following the peace talks, the
UN issued a mandate for NATO to enforce the peace accords, and 60,000 NATO soldiers
entered Bosnia as the Implementation Force (IFOR) with a one year timeline to enforce peace.
These forces were soon replaced by a Stabilization Force which remained in Bosnia until 2004. 86
The next major involvement for NATO was in Kosovo. Beginning in 1989, with
President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia decision to remove autonomy from the area, the situation
in Kosovo proved to be an exceptionally destructive conflict and one which would grow to
necessitate outside involvement. In 1998, Serbian police and military entered into conflict with
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo causing 1,500 deaths and 400,000 refugees. The escalating conflict
drew NATO’s attention, and responding to a UN resolution, NATO began a targeted air
campaign, in addition to diplomatic pressure, with the objective of forcing the withdrawal of
Serbian forces from Kosovo. Though Milosevic initially agreed to ceasefire terms, renewed
Serbian aggression in 1999, in response to an unacceptable peace treaty, resulted in NATO’s
reinstatement of a seventy-eight day, air campaign, without a UN mandate. After the sustained
attack, Milosevic agreed to peace term on June 3, and NATO peacekeepers (KFOR) entered the
nation.87
In addition to the military cost, the Kosovo campaign proved to be a politically trying
event for the Alliance showing some serious differences in the allies’ commitment and
perception of NATO’s roles. Many critics argued that the lack of NATO ground forces to
support the air strikes provided Milosevic with the opportunity to carry out severe ethnic
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cleansing during the end of the conflict, and the critics blamed this lack of force on United States
resistance to involvement in non-essential areas for the United States. Further criticisms outlined
the lack of clear objectives.88 A 2001 report by the United States General Accounting Office on
the issue, argued that the need to maintain cohesion within the Alliance led to several “doctrinal
departures,” such as limiting the scope and duration of the conflict with “vague objectives” and
working alliance casualties to a minimum at the exclusion of ground forces.89 All of these issues
may have lengthened the operation and resulted in unnecessary damages to the area.
Furthermore, the Generals which controlled the attack argued that political pressures by both the
United States and France made it impossible to act efficiently.90
Both the political complications and the overwhelming presence of American weaponry
and personnel, led to two distinct realizations. First, it became apparent that Europe needed a
way to deal with its own problems without the involvement of the United States—a decision
which sparked the acceleration of the European Security and Defense Policy. While NATO
forces would be able to help with European issues, the political difficulties of using American
power were becoming apparent. The second realization was that dealing with a direct conflict is
difficult when constrained by political necessities. While the Alliance chose cohesion over
effective military policy, it was becoming more apparent that this was not necessarily the most
effective military move.91
Enlargement
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As soon as the Cold War appeared to be over and the Warsaw pact was deteriorating,
NATO began offering the olive branch to its former rivals. The rivalry was over and the new era
required greater cooperation and friendship. This initial rhetoric was supported through a
declaration by the NATO leaders in Brussels, in 1994. “They reaffirmed that the Alliance was
open to membership for other European states in a position to further the principles of the North
Atlantic Treaty and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.”92 In other words, the
way was now open for the former Warsaw Pact nations to enter into NATO, for the improved
security of both the new and former allies. The task now lay in creating the legal framework for
such a move, and convincing the domestic governments that it was a strategic move.
The Alliance launched a study in 1995 to determine whether the Alliance should accept
any new allies, especially since these new countries would be from the former Soviet Bloc. It
was concluded that the enlargement would indeed provide a benefit to the Alliance through the
increase in security and the fostering of cooperation and “promoting good-neighborly
relations.”93 As long as the new allies would conform to the “principles, policies and procedures”
of NATO, be willing to accept the costs of membership, and maintain that no outside power (e.g.
Russia) “would have the right to interfere with the process” of accession or of the actions of the
nations within the alliance, the new nations would be allowed to join.94
Convincing the domestic governments of the NATO members to allow expansion was
slightly more difficult, particularly within the United States. Accession protocols had been
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signed in 1997, but all 16 nations had to approve.95 While most nations in Europe could
understand the security benefits of expansion into Eastern Europe (e.g. a barrier against Russia),
many in the United States saw NATO as a burden which was no longer needed. The argument in
the Senate—which was required to approve the measure through a two-thirds vote—ranged
between those who felt that NATO should be abolished, those who thought NATO should be
restricted to Article 5 enforcement only, and those who saw a benefit in integrating new
Democracies. After an extended battle, the Senate approved the enlargement process on April
30,, 1998, but with the understanding that further enlargement would have to wait until the new
allies had shown their worth. With this victory, NATO embraced the accession of three new
members: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, in 1999.
The Long-Term Study and the Strategic Concept of 1999
The issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the escalation of NATO involvement in Kosovo
gradually began to show that the basic structures set up by the Strategic Concept of 1991 were
not sufficient to deal with the growing out-of-area pressures on NATO. A Long Term Study96
(LTS) into the implications of the Strategic Concept of 1991 began in 1994, providing three
major recommendations which would culminate in a new Strategic Concept altering the
Alliance’s military doctrine. First, the LTS outlined the necessary elements to accomplish new
peacekeeping, crisis management, and collective defense.97 Secondly, the LTS resulted in the
creation of a new command structure for NATO. “The new NATO command structure cut
headquarters elements from 65 to about 20, and was based on a series of Joint Sub-Regional
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Commands (JSRCs) and Component Commands (CCs) spread throughout the Alliance.”98
Finally, the LTS suggested the development of the NATO Rapid Deployment Corps (NRDCs).
There should be three High Readiness Forces (HRFs), which could enter an area immediately,
supported by two Forces at Lower Readiness (FLRs) each, which could rotate through in order to
relieve the other Corps. For instance, an HRF would be deployed for 180 days, followed by
FLR1 for 180 days, followed by FLR2 for 180 days, and repeat.99 These three suggestions would
set the stage for the creation of a NATO for a new era.
In 1999, NATO officials met once again to develop a new strategic concept in light of the
more recent developments. This Strategic Concept did not announce many of the real changes in
NATO command structure which were being enacted due to the suggestions of the LTS, but it
did provide the groundwork for many of the future developments of NATO (primarily the
Strategic Concepts of 2002 and 2010). It allowed for the creation of more flexible, rapid
response forces, and stated that involvement in threats against allied interests may be
necessary.100 Importantly, it left the direct distinctions between Article 5 and non-Article 5
threats somewhat unclear, allowing for a greater amount of out-of-area commitment.101 Though
much of the important change in NATO was occurring behind the scenes, the Strategic Concept
of 1999 allowed the world to see some of the new direction NATO was taking, and provide the
basis for future developments.
Why Reality was Different from Theory: Theoretical Analysis of NATO 1989-1999.
As outlined above, neo-realist theory predicted the dissolution of NATO shortly after the
fall of the Soviet Union; however, during the decade immediately following this fall, NATO did
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not only remain, it grew larger through the acquisition of three of its former enemies.
Institutionalism on the other hand, predicted the expansion of NATO’s roles and its reinvention
in order to maintain its organizational structure. On the surface then, it appears as if neo-realist
theory was, at least for this alliance, wrong, while institutionalism was correct.
In one sense this assertion is correct. As NATO found itself without an enemy it began to
look for another mission; another threat to keep it together—keeping with organizational
behavioral theory. However, it is important to note that for all the changes which institutionalism
claims to bring to alliance behavior, according to John Mearsheimer it is basically a
reinterpretation of realism.102 Even the great defender of institutionalism Robert Keohane argues
that institutionalist theory helps to “explain variation in institutional form without denying the
validity of many realist insights into power and interests.”103 The new changes which the
organization goes through in order to keep itself relevant are new threat analyses and essentially
concerns about balancing the threat. It is true that the end of an alliance should come through the
end of a conflict, but if a significant threat remains, it could conceivably remain.
Through the early 1990’s, the possible threat from the imploding Russia remained
legitimate. The Russian military remained strong, the nuclear weapons developed by the Soviet
Union remained a threat, and despite the optimism, there remained a possibility of remission.
Also, the dissolving Soviet Union left behind nations whose ethnic tensions, formerly held in
check due to Soviet influence, returned with fervor. The Strategic Concept of 1991 essentially
declared one theme: “even with all the positive changes, the world remained a dangerous place
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and that NATO cooperation would be essential to help them [Europe] deal with the remaining
risks and uncertainties.”104
The wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo were a key test for NATO; one which
would be able to determine its relevance in the new world order. The perception of threat had
changed, for though it could evolve into a direct danger for the Alliance, this was a situation on
the periphery which did not directly threaten the members of the Alliance. In Bosnia, the
mandate from the UN was helpful in creating an impetus for the intervention, which would serve
as a stepping stone for more involvement in conflicts which did not invoke Article 5. Kosovo
provided a more interesting precedent: involvement in a non-Article 5 security threat without UN
mandate. This move caused debate within the Alliance, but it served to continue the process of
reimagining the unifying threat away from the strength of the Soviet Union, to a series of smaller
threats.105
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and later Kosovo, served as well to create a new mission for
NATO: peacekeeping. Probably the most relevant example of institutionalist theory,
peacekeeping shows the creation of a new purpose for the Alliance in order to keep itself
relevant. Peacekeeping allowed NATO to face growing threats which could possibly effect the
Alliance in the future, by acting on behalf of the United Nations. This process contributed to the
development of the new threat perception of NATO and to the legitimacy of NATO on the world
stage.
The enlargement process in to the former Warsaw Pact countries, though at first glance a
refutation of realist prediction and the following of a purely liberalist agenda, is actually a
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brilliant example of balance of power politics. The security vacuum of the Central European
nations had directly contributed to the rise of two of the more aggressive powers in the history of
Europe: Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.106 By allowing the accession of Poland, the Czech
Republic, and Hungary into NATO, the Alliance solidified the security situation within the area
and moved to prevent the reemergence of any expansionist power. Furthermore, the new
members remained directly concerned with the Russian threat, contributing to their alliance with
a stronger protector to balance against the perceived threat.
Two other factors support neo-realist theory: the reduction and restructuring of the
military presence and the cohesion problems faced during the engagement with Kosovo. The
removal of military personnel from Europe directly corresponds with the balancing of threat
hypothesis. Since the threat faced by the Alliance was no longer as great, the troop level needed
to defend against conceivable threats was dramatically reduced. Furthermore, now that the
threats faced by the Alliance were much more varied and decentralized, the military structure
needed to face them had to change. This restructuring towards the NRDCs and smaller command
centers shows a realization of the new threat faced by NATO.
The final and most important example of the validity of neo-realist alliance theory is the
growing frustration within the Alliance exhibited during the air raids on Kosovo. The lack of a
significant threat significantly decreases the cohesion of the Alliance. While the Alliance did
choose to remain together and present a united front, the tensions within the Alliance were
beginning to show—particularly between the Americans and the rest of Europe. America
provided, and had been providing for the majority of the history of NATO, the majority of the
forces, monetary funds, and military direction for the Alliance. Hence, America had generally
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controlled the policies of the Alliance. This particular situation, however, was seen as “the hour
of Europe;” the problem which could be solved by Europeans without American interference.107
The frustration, on both sides, of having to conform to the desires of the other members of the
Alliance and not pursue the “correct” doctrinal path is evident in both the responses of the
Generals and the GAO report on the issue.
The general conclusions which can be made about the first decade after the end of the
Cold War are essentially neo-realist in nature with an institutionalist slant. While there is a
distinct truth in institutionalist theory, primarily in the initial desires for the organization to
remain together and the restructuring of roles, the majority of the results show a continued
adherence to balance of threat policy. The Alliance adapted to the changing threats it faced, not
through a bureaucratic effort to maintain itself, but rather because these were the greatest threats
facing the Alliance at the time. These new threats were much less predictable and far less
powerful than the Soviet threat; therefore, the Alliance was forced to change its approach,
causing a drastic reduction in forces. Though much more varied and chaotic, the opposing threats
did not measure up to the massive threat of the Soviet Union, and the appearance of tensions
between the members of the Alliance follows the prediction of neo-realist balance of threat
theory.

Chapter 5: Beginning of the End: 2001-Present
The turn of the century brought with it a series of new challenges for the members of
NATO. Faced with the specter of global terror after the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001, the
United States invoked Article 5 for the first time in the history of the Alliance. This decision, in
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conjunction with a UN mandate, took the Alliance into its first conflict outside of European soil,
as they moved in to secure Afghanistan in 2002.
The year 2002 brought with it other major changes for the Alliance. Meeting in Prague,
the Alliance put forth its newest Strategic Concept, the result of a decade of steady doctrinal
changes to the military structure. NATO now had the jurisdiction to act “out of area” and the
structure to deal with the chaotic nature of the new threats in the 21st century.
2003 saw the United States engage in its war against Saddam Hussein, without a mandate
from the United Nations and supported only by the “coalition of the willing.” The United States’
unilateralism in the managing of both this new conflict and the war in Afghanistan produced an
ever-growing annoyance within NATO, particularly in the older members of the Alliance.
In 2004, the Alliance accepted 10 new members, and by 2009 they had accepted 3 more
raising the total amount of members to 26. This expansion brought with it new problems:
conflicts with Russia, the broadening of the Alliance’s objectives, and a myriad of issues with
the planning side of NATO missions.
In 2010, NATO officials met once again to announce yet another Strategic Concept in
order to map out the future of the Alliance for the next 10 years. The new concept restated the
allies’ unity, their commitment to the Alliance and their understanding of the new threats facing
the Alliance in the conceivable future. Finally, the Alliance recommitted to the protection of their
common values and the principles of common defense.
This chapter will delve into all of these new issues facing the Alliance in the first decade
of the 21st century. It will show the new developments of NATO, the new threats the Alliance is
preparing for, and the tensions which are beginning to build throughout the Alliance. These
cracks in the Alliance will be examined and explained, with the ultimate conclusion that they are
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being created by the lack of a substantial threat, in continuation of the central argument of this
paper.
Creating a Direction for the Future: NATO’s 2002 Strategic Concept
Whatever plans NATO had for its future, they were accelerated after the terrorist attacks
on the United States on September 11, 2001. For only the second time in recent American
history, American blood had been spilled on American soil by a foreign invader. The fear and
uncertainty which emerged from this attack prompted the first invocation of Article 5 in the
history of the Alliance, and resulted in the joint attack and occupation of Afghanistan.108 Partly
in response to the new military endeavors and partly as a result of events set in motion during the
last meeting in 1999, NATO officials met once again to discuss the newest strategic concept for
the Alliance and to formalize the further expansion of NATO.
Meeting in Prague, in November 21-22, 2002, the Alliance once again committed to
dealing with these new challenges by altering the framework of the Alliance. This time it was
completely accepted that there would need to be a development of rapid deployment forces—
referred to as the NATO Response Force (NRF)—consisting of 21,000 air, ground, and naval
troops; the final implementation of the LTS which developed in the early 1990’s.109 They also
agreed on a “reform of NATO’s command structure to move away from its old geographic focus
into a new functional approach organized around a command for ‘operations’ and another for
‘transformation.’”110 This would allow NATO to act outside of its former area of jurisdiction,
thus allowing for involvement in Afghanistan. Finally, NATO formally accepted the accession of
seven new members: Bulgaria Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, with
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the express purpose of strengthening NATO’s “ability to face the challenges of today and
tomorrow.”111 This movement would raise some inflammatory responses in Russia, but
ultimately the Alliance was more concerned about avoiding the potential of a resurgence of the
Soviet Union than the strengthening of Russia into a realistic rival.112
Ultimately the Prague summit has been seen as the culmination of the necessary changes
in the post-Cold War security structure, and the implementation of the major changes which had
been suggested as early as 1990.113 Ironically, the Alliance made these massive changes and
commitments to a strengthening of the Alliance right at the point when the Alliance was facing
the beginning of its biggest struggle for cohesion: the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.
The Threats of the 21st Century: How Has NATO Responded?
With the advent of the 21st century and the efforts NATO has taken to reinvent itself for
the future, it is especially important to identify the new possible threats which NATO is facing
and the ways it has responded to these threats. As NATO has sought to prove that it remains a
necessary organization despite the fulfillment of its original mission, its response to the threats it
faces will show us the effectiveness of its reorganization and the likelihood of the Alliance’s
continued survival throughout the 21st century.

The War on Terror
If there is any single issue which has provided new life to NATO, it is terrorism. Even
before the attacks of September 11, NATO had seen the potential dangers of terrorism to
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members of the Alliance. In the 1999 Strategic Concept, terrorism was called “a serious threat to
peace, security and stability that can threaten the territorial integrity of States.”114 After the
events of September 11, however, the threat of terrorism took on new meaning. The strongest
and seemingly most protected member of NATO had been attacked on its own soil, and Article 5
was invoked for the first time in history. Immediately the United States asked for NATO support
in its mission to eliminate the terrorist threat from Afghanistan (the nation from which the
perpetrators received protection and training). NATO responded quickly and efficiently by
providing the United States with air protection, freeing up American forces to attack
Afghanistan. It became apparent that the Alliance was again necessary. The United States’
Ambassador to NATO would state at a NATO summit: “With the battle against terrorism now
engaged, it is difficult to imagine a future without the Alliance at the core of the efforts to defend
our civilization.”115 It had become apparent that the threat of terrorism would be the main threat
of the 21st Century.
Despite all of the rhetoric from the United States, it soon became evident that the Bush
Administration was reluctant to accept contributions from European allies. While NATO troops
did get involved in Operation Enduring Freedom, and eventually played a large part in the
peacekeeping efforts, the desire to carry out this campaign according to American military
doctrine without NATO interference was strong, for two key reasons. Primarily, the Kosovo
campaign remained fresh in the minds of the American generals, and since this was a war with
direct American interests, the generals did not want to get involved once more in the bureaucratic
battles which lengthened the Kosovo engagement.116 The second important reason behind this
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desire to “go it alone” was the core American distrust of ceding rights to international
organizations. While the American government was willing to cooperate in dealing with issues
on the periphery of its own interests, “the attacks on New York and Washington strengthened the
United States’ belief in the legitimacy of its values and interests.”117 Therefore, it was important
to defend American values with American weapons.
Interestingly, the United States complained about the lack of usefulness of NATO forces
even while denying them the ability to play a bigger part. Even longtime NATO supporter,
Senator Richard Lugar went on record saying: “If NATO is not up to the challenge of becoming
effective in the new war against terrorism, then our political leaders may be inclined to search for
something else that will answer this need.”118 The Europeans were perplexed by this reluctance
given their enthusiasm for involvement, leaving some to comment that the United States was
more interested in NATO support for clean-up efforts than for actually carrying out the
mission.119
The “War on Terror” has brought a significant amount of issues to the Alliance, both
militarily and politically. Since 2002, Alliance forces have been engaged in maintaining security
and performing peacekeeping missions throughout the nation, and they—in conjunction with a
large influx of American military forces in the recent years—have been relatively successful.
Nevertheless, the 42 different nations became involved in the Afghanistan force (including all 28
members of NATO), has lead to a considerable amount of bureaucratic headaches:
Some governments’ troops lack the appropriate equipment to function with other
NATO forces. Some nations will not permit their troops to deploy to other parts
of Afghanistan. Still others prohibit their troops from participating in combat
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operations unless in self-defense. NATO commanders have willingly accepted
troops from some 42 governments but have had to shape the conduct of the
mission to fit the capabilities of and caveats on those troops.120
Other issues between the allies include disagreements on troop placement, burden sharing,
missions of NATO forces in the area, duration of the involvement, and most importantly
differing military policies.121 For example, on April 1, 2011, German troops were unable to take
action to defend UN workers who were being massacred close to their position. Military doctrine
forced them to stand by as an international force was murdered, for they are not allowed to
engage without direct provocation.122 Despite all of these issues, NATO has been able to bring
about a level of success in Afghanistan. Forces are set to leave in 2014, and there are initial
transfers of power over to the Afghani government set to take place in July 2011.123
In relation to the war on terror as a whole, Afghanistan has shown a few key flaws in the
use of such a threat as a unifier for NATO. Initially, there is no consistency to the threat. While
the initial attacks of 2011, and the subsequent attacks throughout Europe, made the allies feel
“more vulnerable than at any time since the end of the Cold War,” the reality is that there have
been no real significant attacks in Europe or the United States for quite some time. This lack of
threat has led to a general sense of distaste towards the war. In the United States for instance,
approximately two-thirds of the population stated in a recent poll that the war in Afghanistan was
not worth the cost.124 The second major problem is that it has revealed some major issues
between the United States and Europe, particularly in the treatment of prisoners from the Afghan
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war. Issues such as the Abu Ghraib prison scandal and the United States policy of detention at
Guantanamo Bay, have driven wedges between the allies and led this threat to be more of a
divider than a unifier.125
The Threat of Russia
Russia has been, and remains, one of the more difficult problems which NATO has to
face. The threat caused by the Soviet Union, of which Russia was a significant part, was the
central reason behind, and ever since the collapse of the USSR, Russia has remained a player in
European security politics. Since it is composed of an area of 17,098,242 km2 and made up of a
population of almost 140 million, Russia remains, on paper, a force to be reckoned with.126
“Russia’s relations with NATO have passed several stages after the demise of the
USSR—from euphoria and great expectations in early 1990’s to mutual dissatisfaction and
mistrust in the late 1990’s,” to cooperation during the early 2000’s and finally to further
dissatisfaction and mistrust after the Georgia crisis and the missile defense propositions in
Eastern Europe at the end of the first decade of the 21st century.127 In 1991, NATO allowed
Russia entry into the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in order to increase cooperation
between the two powers, followed shortly by the Partnership for Peace agreement in 1994. In
2002, NATO developed the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which was designed to coordinate
their responses to common threats, particularly terrorism. Russia also was involved in the Bosnia
and Kosovo campaigns.128

125

Morelli and Belkin, 21.
“Russia,” CIA World Factbook, www.cia.gov, Accessed 4/13/11.
127
Nadia Alexandrova Arbatova, “The EU and NATO Enlargement: A Russian View,” in NATO and the European
Union: New World, New Europe, New Threats, ed. Hall Gardner, (Burlington: Ashgate, 2004), 117.
128
“NATO’s Relations with Russia,” www.nato.int, Accessed 4/13/11
126

Pedersen 56

Despite these promising advances in NATO-Russian relations, there remains a significant
amount of tension between the two parties, based primarily in NATO’s enlargement into the
former Warsaw Pact nations. As stated previously, NATO expanded into the traditionally weak
Central and Eastern European countries in order to both provide them with security and prevent
the re-expansion of Soviet power. From the perspective of the historic members of the Alliance,
“NATO’s expansion eastwards can be also assessed as the West’s disbelief in Russia’s
democratic future.”129 For the Central and Eastern European countries which have joined with
NATO, the concerns are slightly more immediate. For these nations, the Russia remains a
looming threat consistently on their borders. While NATO may be more of a protector of
interests in the eyes of the Western members, it remains a powerful symbol of collective defense
and balancing of threat against the Soviet Union for the Central and Eastern European countries.
Looking particularly at the Baltic States, many of these nations “remain indefensible against
Russia without large NATO redeployments or nuclear deterrence.”130
Tensions between Russia and NATO came to a head in 2008 when Russia sent troops to
Georgia, allegedly in direct response to Georgian violence against Russian civilians in South
Ossetia. NATO condemned this as a disproportionately large attack and scolded Russia for its
overbearing response, and in Washington, this merely strengthened the belief that Russia was a
danger, with many saying that if Georgia would have been a member of NATO Russia would not
have attacked. Western Europeans are not so sure.131 The Russian belief is that NATO had been
pursuing a strategy of isolation towards Russia, impinging on the security and prestige of
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Russia.132 This strategy might have provoked a display of Russian power to prevent NATO from
continuing this expansion, especially after the offer of NATO accession to Georgia and Ukraine.
In any case, this caused a reconsideration of expansion into the area.
For all of the threats felt by the Central and Eastern European countries in regards to
Russia, “Russia’s military weight has diminished dramatically and, with all concerns about its
unpredictability, it cannot be assessed as a direct threat to the West. This has been all the more
the case after September 11 since Russia sided with the West against the threat of terrorism.”133
Russia still possesses a large nuclear arsenal, but its army is largely out-dated. Furthermore, its
economic and political situations are more akin to a normal middle-income capitalist nation than
a world superpower.134 Finally, while Russia has been hailed as one of the more rapidly
developing nations in the world, it is not the threat it used to be either in military might,
economic power, or in ideological influence.
Failed States and Civil Wars
The other major threat which NATO has been facing is that of failed states and the
resulting civil wars which come out of them. While not directly threatening to the security of
NATO members, these conflicts often affect the interests of the allies, whether it is through
damaging economic interests, the potential for refugees, the conflicts potential of migrating onto
European soil, or simple humanitarian concern. The most famous of these threats was in the
Balkans, which, as discussed in chapter four, was seen as having the potential for causing unrest
in the Western Europe and as escalating into serious human rights concerns. These conflicts tend
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to be less of a unifying central threat to NATO, and more of a general concern which is
addressed in conjunction with UN mandate.
The recent situation in Libya has provided an interesting example in this style of threat.
Riding on the surge of democratic pressure flowing throughout the Middle East and Northern
Africa, opposition forces emerged in Libya demanding the removal of eccentric dictator
Muammar Gaddafi. As the conflict escalated, it soon became apparent that Gaddafi’s resistance
to this demand was leading to civil war. This proved to be a large concern for many Western
European nations who are separated from Libya by only a small stretch of water. On March 17,
2011, the United Nations issued a Resolution authorizing NATO to work to protect civilians by
“all necessary measures.”135 From March 22-24 NATO began a slow escalation from enforcing
an arms embargo to enforcing a no-fly zone and then making bombing runs in support of the
opposition forces. NATO has formally announced that it will not send in ground troops to
Libya.136
This situation is particularly interesting because of the change it is displaying in NATO
decision-making. In going into Afghanistan, the Alliance (and especially the United States) acted
strongly, quickly and with full-force. Now in Libya, however, there has been a general reluctance
to get involved in the issue, and when called-upon by the United Nations, NATO responded with
a relatively small action. Even more interesting are the tensions which this mission is revealing
within the NATO command structure. Without the United States making a significant
commitment to the effort—President Obama having stated that the United States will be taking
more of a “supporting role”—the European nations are being forced to take on a greater share of
the bombing; a role they have not had to provide in the past NATO actions and one they do not
135
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have the capability to maintain for a long period of time.137 Furthermore, it is becoming evident
that the European allies are not able to perform as effectively as they would like. For example, in
at least two separate occasions in early April, NATO forces have mistakenly fired on the Libyan
opposition fighters who NATO is supposed to be helping, showing a disgraceful lack of
coordination by the NATO forces.138
This issue is causing much debate on the aspects of burden-sharing, and showing that,
without United States leadership, NATO missions are much more difficult to maintain.
Furthermore, this development has shown the necessity of a large threat, outside of regional
interests, in order to get all of the players in NATO to agree on a necessary direction.
Looking Towards 2020: The Newest Strategic Concept for the Alliance
The issues which the Alliance faced during the course of the first decade of the 21st
century led it to consider, once again, the need to develop a new Strategic Concept. The new
tensions within the Alliance threatened its very existence and, as it had done in 1991, the
Alliance needed to reassert its commitment and reunify its members.
In May 2010, a “group of experts” met to decide on the new direction which the Alliance
should be taking. Their preamble provides an interesting insight into the concerns facing NATO
and the challenges to its cohesion. First of all they outline the need for this new Strategic
Concept in order to “highlight NATO’s many contributions to international stability and peace.
Otherwise, the organization could fail to retain the public backing and financial support it must
have to perform critical tasks well.”139 This statement shows a significant issue faced by the
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Alliance: the lack of public support and funding. As the threat facing the Alliance has dropped,
the populations of the member nations have been less supportive in funding NATO’s activities.
Without popular support, NATO could easily lose its mandate and much of its funding.
The other major concern which is expressed by this group of experts relates to the
growing lack of cohesion within the Alliance:
The new Strategic Concept must also serve as an invocation of political will or—
to put it another way—a renewal of vows, on the part of each member. Threats to
the interests of the Alliance come from the outside, but the organization’s vigour
could as easily be sapped from within. The increasing complexity of the global
political environment has the potential to gnaw away at Alliance cohesion;
economic headaches can distract attention from security needs; old rivalries could
resurface; and the possibility is real of a damaging imbalance between the military
contributions of some members and that of others. NATO states cannot allow
twenty-first century dangers to do what past perils could not: divide their leaders
and weaken their collective resolve. Thus, the new Strategic Concept must clarify
both what NATO should be doing for each Ally and what each Ally should be
doing for NATO.140
The struggles within the Alliance, as outlined above, are seen to be causing cracks within
the previous resolve of the Alliance. In the previous passage, it is apparent that the organization
itself is concerned with the potential for disbandment. While the Alliance has continued to
expand up until this point—thus increasing its material strength—its unity, and strength of will,
can be seen to be diminishing. This expansion has also created the problem of finding a
consensus in the approach to security. Having twenty eight members in the decision making
process makes it more difficult to address each of their respective concerns and thus to find a
consensus. For instance, as shown above, the Russian question is a much more pressing issue for
the Eastern European countries than for the West. This division in priorities has led to some
conflicting opinions in the creation of a missile defense system and the resulting problems with
Russia.
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In addressing these concerns, in addition to the concerns raised by potential security
threats, the experts recommended a series of guidelines for developing the new Strategic
Concept. These recommendations include: commitment to providing security against
unconventional threats; improving the partnership between NATO and a variety of other powers,
such as Russia, the EU, the UN, the OSCE, and Middle Eastern states; unifying the financial
policy by revising rules for contributions and giving the Secretary General the ability to enforce
these rules; improving the issue of consensus through making it possible to give reservations to
an idea without a veto; finally, in terms of military deployment, the Alliance should have a more
unified command structure, and continued rapid response capabilities.141
On November 19, 2010, the Alliance issued its most recent Strategic Concept essentially
outlining everything suggested by the group of experts. The only major addition was the
Alliance’s commitment to defense through crisis management, which allowed the Alliance to get
involved in issues to prevent and manage crises which could provide a threat to NATO
members.142 This section is particularly important for it allows direct intervention in an area with
the goal of preventing a conflict, as opposed to simply managing one or providing peacekeeping
support. The implications of this are very large, for no longer is NATO withholding its
capabilities to simple prevention (i.e. Article 5), it is now able to preemptively get involved
before the issue comes to a head.

General Tensions within the Alliance
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In addition to, or perhaps because of, the lack of any real threat faced by the Alliance in
the 21st century an additional set of tensions have begun to emerge between the members of the
Alliance. Occurring particularly across the Atlantic, between the United States and Europe, these
tensions are a result of cultural and political differences which are beginning to manifest
themselves due to the lack of a significant unifier for the Alliance.
The first major point of dissention within the Alliance is the recent tendency towards
American unilateralism in its policies. While the United States does work with NATO, it seems
to many Europeans as almost an afterthought, or a mere formality to appease the Europeans. The
first major reason behind this behavior is, while it is true that the Europeans have a greater
supply of armed personnel in the area than the United States,
their principal categories of advanced weaponry and equipment are far less
numerous and only one half as much is spent to support them. Empirically, the
United States needs NATO less as a single, unified alliance than as a reservoir of
potential components for coalitions of the willing.143
As shown by the United States comportment in the months leading up the war in Iraq, it really
does not matter to the United States where the help comes from as long as it comes.
The other reason for this perception of unilateralism is that most of the conflicts which
currently interest the United States are not on European soil. Quite frankly, “the US is an Asian
power, but the Europeans are not.”144 The increase in American presence in the Middle East has
led to a greater concentration of United States forces in the areas surrounding their conflicts (e.g.
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan). Unless there is a considerable shift in level of
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conflict, “America’s capacities for military intervention and global reach will be housed
increasingly outside the confines of Cold War-era NATO.”145
On the European front, there is beginning to be an ever greater lack of popular support
for international peacekeeping and defense policy in general. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars
have significantly decreased European interest in following American military operations, and
the lack of military threat from anywhere outside the EU fails to justify any investment into
military capabilities. A theory only strengthened during the economic crisis.146
In essence, NATO is rapidly becoming an “alliance à la carte,” to use the phrase coined
by Joseph Nye.147 Both sides of the Atlantic want NATO to remain simply so that they can have
their pick at the different benefits it provides. Part of this is a result of cultural differences, for as
stated above, American’s are more leery of international bodies while Europeans tend to embrace
them more fully.148 But the most important reality is that the need for NATO is slowly
deteriorating, with the lack of any real serious threat as shown above.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
Summary of Findings
This paper has shown a series of trends throughout the history of NATO, all of which
lead up to an apparent reality expressed in the previous chapter: NATO is approaching its
dénouement as a military alliance. There are three distinct conclusions which can be reached
through the data provided: the threat faced by NATO has deteriorated to a base level of urgency,
the organizational and institutional forces which have emerged through the history of the
organization are working to prevent the Alliance’s unraveling, and finally the allies have
developed into a security community. Each of these trends provides clues into the future of both
the Alliance and its members.
The central trend in NATO’s history is its reliance on a unifying threat as a method of
retaining cohesion within the Alliance. During the Cold War the obvious threat was the Soviet
Union. This opponent created the impetus for the creation of the Alliance and overcame a series
of cohesion issues, such as the fear of German rearmament. Since the decline and fall of the
Soviet Union, the Alliance has been searching for a new enemy to face which can provide a
reason for its continuation (a result of the organizational friction to be discussed below). In the
1990’s, the Balkan wars provided a likely target: they were within European territory, they had
the potential to spill over into NATO soil, and they were rapidly becoming human rights
disasters. The Alliance’s involvement in the Bosnia and Kosovo wars provided it with a method
to reinvent itself and a threat through which it could remain important. Yet even these threats
were insufficient in maintaining the cohesion of the Alliance, and tensions began to show during
the operations in Kosovo.
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The most recent threats faced by the Alliance have also proven unable to fill the position
of the Soviet Union. While the “war on terror” provided a new use for the Alliance and resulted
in the first ever invocation of Article 5, the unilateralism of the United States and the differing
military policies have created even deeper problems within the Alliance. As of the present day,
many European nations are decreasing their commitment. Russia has also proven to be
unsatisfactory in its possible position as nemesis. While the fear of Russia has allowed for
NATO expansion in Eastern Europe, the reality is that the majority of Western Europe does not
fear Russia—and in military terms they are completely justified. Finally, the civil wars in which
NATO has become involved, such as Libya, have merely provided a window into the struggles
facing the Alliance. The lack of the United States’ guidance and technology makes it impossible
for the Alliance to act for an extended period of time.
In essence there is no threat sufficient enough to sustain NATO. Regional interests may
continue to provide momentary threats, but the real necessity of such a grand alliance is finished.
When that is combined with the cost of maintenance of such a body, the likelihood of a long
term continuation of NATO is slim.
The second major trend which emerged throughout the paper was the strength of
institutional forces and their reluctance to change. Organizational theory predicts an organization
making efforts to reinvent itself when the original purpose for its creation has ended. This
behavior is readily apparent in the actions taken by NATO immediately after the end of the Cold
War. NATO attempted to find new threats and thus new purposes for it to remain relevant, and
ultimately it settled on taking action on behalf of the UN, acting as a peace enforcer in a variety
of different conflicts, and enlarging itself in order to increase the stability of Europe.
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The actions on behalf of the United Nations have renewed NATO; giving the alliance a
chance to perform a new mission in addition to its traditional defensive maneuvers. In addition to
the actions on behalf of the United Nations, NATO also took on other threats, expanding its
jurisdiction to allow it to preemptively deal with conflicts which might have a later threat on the
NATO members. Finally, the Alliance took on the new role of expansion, which worked to
stabilize Central and Eastern Europe and prevent the expansion of powers, such as Russia, into
the area. The expansion essentially became a new mission for the Alliance, using diplomacy
instead of military might as an increase in cohesion and influence. All of these new missions,
while not fabricated, were leapt upon by the bureaucratic elements as a continued reason for
existence. Through these processes NATO was able to maintain its existence beyond the period
when it should have deteriorated, and keep itself relevant in the new era of world politics.
The final consistent trend within NATO’s history is its development into a “security
community” or rather an area where no military conflict can conceivably take place between the
participating members. The members of NATO have worked, traded, and fought together for so
many years that the prospect of actual conflict in the foreseeable future is virtually impossible.
Both constructivist and liberalist theory would lead us to conclude that the nations will continue
to work together in a political framework, whether or not they proceed with joint military action.
The Trans-Atlantic relationship will not go anywhere for a long time.
The conclusions we can reach, based upon the previous trends, are that the North Atlantic
Treaty will reach its end as a military alliance in the following years (as eloquently stated by
Kenneth Waltz, “NATO’s days aren’t numbered but its years are”149), yet there will remain a
political alliance. The shape of this political body is difficult to predict, that it will maintain the
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general form of NATO’s councils and meetings of ministers is probable, but the conclusion that
can be reached is that the military body as a whole will end. There is simply no reason for it to
continue as a military body, given that there are no serious threats which emerge in the next 5-10
years.
Implications and Suggestions
The dissolution of NATO as a military alliance could have a very serious impact on the
power structures of Europe and its surrounding areas. If it does not retire gracefully, with
maintenance of the predicted political ties, there is a possibility of a return to the multipolar
power politics which defined the nineteenth and twentieth century’s in Europe. With the fall of
such a powerful military body could come a void of power, allowing for the rise of another great
power. Such a development, especially in the years of atomic weaponry, would be potentially
disastrous for the peace of Europe and the world as a whole. Therefore, it is important that care
be taken that the political ties and alliances which have aided in the maintenance of NATO be
preserved in the organizations absence. The following section will provide a rough timeline of
NATO’s dissolution and the policy suggestions for maintaining peace in Europe (as well as
ensuring the adherence to certain interests of both sides of the Atlantic).
In the short term it is likely that very little change will be seen in NATO as an
organization. The tensions apparent in the Libya crisis and the Afghanistan situation will become
more consistent in the various actions taken by the Alliance, but the need for allies in the
fulfillment of each ally’s interests is sufficient enough to maintain a certain level of cohesion.
Much like in Kosovo, where the allies gave up certain doctrinal necessities to ensure
cooperation, the short term future involvements of the Alliance will involve increasingly tense
collaboration in exchange for the completion of certain interests. For instance, the United States
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should continue to work within NATO and give certain concessions to its European allies in
order to ensure cooperation and support in the Afghanistan campaign. America needs the
legitimacy provided by NATO support, so until Afghanistan is completed, it should, and
probably will, continue to support European interests in other locations. The European allies also
will have realized that performing any major military operation without American aid is
impossible. The Libya situation has shown that fact more powerfully than any other conflict in
recent history. Therefore, they will continue to make concessions with the United States, such as
working in Afghanistan despite the lack of popular support, in order to retain American support
for their more regional interests.
In the mid-term the solidification of NATO as a body used for dealing with national
interests will be complete. In Joseph Nye’s phrase, the Alliance will become an “alliance à la
carte,” where each ally can grab the others in order to fulfill certain regional needs.150 The
Alliance will remain united in name only, with the majority of its actions being taken in
exchange for commitments of future support for possible regional interests. From an American
perspective, the issue with this framework is the limited usefulness of the European allies in
dealing with the problems which it is likely to face in its future. The Middle East and Asia are
the two most likely locations of conflict for the United States, and Europe is not nearly
influential enough in that area in order for the United States to continue supporting Europe in its
regional endeavors. The United States will thus shift more and more of its troops out of Europe
and towards the areas of conflict. Furthermore, given the European public’s lack of enthusiasm
for military policy, it is likely that the nations of Europe will retain a marginal military power
supported by the threat of nuclear weapons. While NATO will continue in name due mostly to
150
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the strength of the institutional forces, its unity will be a myth, made reality only in times of
crisis.
In the long term, the involvement of the United States in European affairs will be
marginal. Faced with conflicts in the East, and given the need for the United States to act
multilaterally in its foreign affairs, in order to justify intervention, it is likely that the United
States will create a sort of NATO like body in the area to balance the potential threat of growing
powers in China or other regional powers in Asia and the Middle East.151 The United States will
also finish its movement of forces towards the areas of greater crisis. Without the strong military
commitment of the United States, the utility of NATO as a military force in Europe will become
marginal as well; with its role taken over by either the EU or a regional alliance emerging to fill
the void left by NATO. Politically, if the United States acts rationally, the Transatlantic
Relationship will remain strong through continued trade and interactions. This will maintain the
support of Europe, which will be essential in justifying actions through multilateral cooperation.
This relationship will probably continue to be expressed through a body similar to NATO, but
without the military aspects of the Alliance; in essence an area of discussion between leaders.
NATO’s end as a military alliance is virtually inevitable, given the current trends of the
political landscape. However, there is no reason why the Trans-Atlantic “security community”
cannot endure. Continued political interactions and discussions between Europe and the United
States will be integral in the continuation of peace in Europe, for this will allow cooperation
instead of multipolar competition. As NATO reaches its end, the allies would be wise to allow it
to decline gracefully, thus preventing the return of the chaotic power politics in NATO’s past.
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